No legal requirement to communicate non-consent to sexual contact: SCC
Observers say pair of decisions may result in more accused being acquitted
Connectez-vous pour écouter l'article
The Supreme Court of Canada has found that there is no legal requirement to communicate non-consent to sexual contact.
Futher, if the defence does not argue an honest but mistaken belief in consent, that doesn’t automatically mean the Crown has proved intent.
That decision comes in the matter of R. v. Degale, where a man was charged with aggravated sexual assault after his then-girlfriend emerged extremely distressed from a van and told people in his apartment building that he had raped her. Police found blood in the van and the building. Medical records showed that the woman suffered injuries serious enough to require surgery.
Despite this, at trial, the man was acquitted of aggravated sexual assault. The judge found that although the actus reus — the physical element of the crime — could be proven beyond a reasonable doubt given the violent circumstances of the injuries, he said there was not enough evidence to show the man knew she wasn’t consenting, or that he was wilfully blind or reckless about her lack of consent.
The Ontario Court of Appeal disagreed, finding the trial judge erred in law by failing to recognize that the evidence establishing the physical elements of the offence also proved the mens rea — the man’s state of mind. He appealed his aggravated sexual assault conviction to the Supreme Court, which unanimously dismissed it.
However, the top court was split 5-4 in its reasoning around the statutory interpretation of establishing the mens rea. The concurring judges, led by Justice Sheilah Martin, felt there should be a new “pathway” for finding objective fault. This was rejected by the majority, which said only Parliament could make such a change to the law.
In a second case, R. v. Bilinski, a man removed his condom during a sexual encounter, despite the woman explicitly telling him he had to wear one during intercourse.
At trial, it was a question of whether the woman consented to sex without a condom. Bilinski didn’t raise the defence of honest but mistaken belief that she’d communicated her consent.
While the jury was instructed on consent, the judge did not give clear
instructions to explain how the complainant’s lack of consent relates to the physical element of sexual assault while the accused’s state of mind about the complainant’s non-consent relates to the mental element of sexual assault. The man was acquitted.
The majority of the Alberta Court of Appeal found the judge made two errors when instructing the jury. First, the judge failed to explain that when assessing the accused’s state of mind, they were required to consider that consent must be communicated by words or conduct.
The judge should also have told the jury that if it found the woman had not consented, it should have “little difficulty” finding that the man knew about, was wilfully blind to, or was reckless about, her lack of consent. The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal and ordered a new trial. That was appealed to the Supreme Court, which ruled 7-2 that the appeal should be dismissed.
Although the top court disagreed that a “little difficulty” instruction was mandatory, it found that the lack of clear instruction on distinguishing the meaning of consent warranted a new trial.
In both cases, the need to find mens rea when the defence of honest but mistaken belief was unavailable was a common point, as was the need to ensure it was not established by another means.
“The trier of fact cannot have a reasonable doubt as to mens rea on the basis that the accused may have believed the complainant communicated consent where the defence was not raised or available,” Chief Justice Richard Wagner and Justice Mary Moreau wrote for the majority in Degale.
“This gives effect to Parliament’s concern that the defence not rely on mistakes of law or myths and stereotypes about consent, and the courts’ concern that the defence not re-enter the trial ‘through the back door’.”
Lauren Shadley, a partner at Shadley Knerr in Montreal and chair of the CBA’s criminal justice section, says the fact the Court was divided in Degale shows that this complex area of law is still evolving.
“The Supreme Court has made an important distinction between the absence of a defence and proof of guilt,” she said in an email.
“An accused person may have no available defence of mistaken belief in consent, but that does not relieve the Crown of its obligation to establish criminal intent.”
Regarding the Belinski decision, she said that clear, workable guidance on jury instructions is essential to fair trials and to sparing complainants and the accused the toll of a retrial.
Janine Benedet, a professor at the Peter A. Allard School of Law at the University of British Columbia and co-counsel for the Vancouver Rape Relief Society, which intervened in Belinski and Degale, says the cases are more broadly about how to define the fault requirement for sexual assault.
“It’s an important decision both to mistaken belief in consent and the question of knowledge of non-consent, but it also applies to age,” she says.
“Anytime the accused is disputing that he knew that the complainant was [underage], it applies to those circumstances as well.”
The Society argued for trying to find the objective fault standard, which only the minority adopted in Degale. Benedet says the majority endorsed an approach that is extraordinarily complicated and artificial, and will result in more acquittals.
“Those guys who say they didn’t think about consent or age effectively have an out.”
She says that the distinction of finding fault when there is no mistaken belief feels artificial, as those mental states are functionally the same. The majority undermines Parliament’s thinking in the 1990s when it drafted section 237.2(b) of the Criminal Code, which states that the mistaken belief defence is not available when “the accused did not take reasonable steps, in the circumstances known to the accused at the time, to ascertain that the complainant was consenting.”
“The [minority] understood the argument we were making, and recognized that for the reasonable steps provision to have any real meaning and to do its job, you have to understand it as modifying the fault requirement for the offence,” Benedet says.
“Someone who fails to take reasonable steps, or there is no evidence they did, to ascertain consent or age, is at fault. You don’t get to argue that the mens rea is not proven where the Crown shows beyond a reasonable doubt that you failed to take those reasonable steps.”
Benedet says that introduces an objective element into the notion of fault, which is accepted for other offences in the Criminal Code. She hopes Parliament will take up the invitation to clarify the intended interpretation of this provision.
As well, she says trying to establish mens rea without considering the mistaken belief defence gives juries a very narrow sphere in which to operate. If it’s not raised in the evidence, juries will likely do “through the back door what they can’t do through the front.”
“If you’re defence counsel, why would you ever raise the defence of mistaken belief in consent?” Benedet asks.
“You’re just going to ask for that mens rea instruction and effectively you get the benefit of the defence in every single case without ever having to worry about reasonable steps. That’s the concern we had.”
Cee Strauss, senior staff lawyer at LEAF, which intervened in Belinksi, says they’re happy that in the context of a culture that does not believe survivors, the Court has affirmed that only yes means yes.
“They did identify where the potential for bias exists in jury instructions and they took steps to prevent it.”
Strauss says it’s important for jurors in terms of clarity, though the ordered retrial means the survivor will be re-traumatized again. Clearer instructions will make it less likely new trials will be ordered in the future.
Even with this new clarity, they say the law remains stacked against the survivor in many ways. These cases demonstrate the inadequacy of the criminal legal system in delivering justice to survivors due to the complexity of the rules and the difficulty survivors face in being believed.
“It brings to mind the importance of investing in prevention of sexual assault and in alternatives to the criminal justice system because of how difficult the process is for survivors, and the real possibility for error by justice system actors along the way.”